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SEPARABILITY, COMPETENCE-COMPETENCE AND THE
ARBITRATOR’S JURISDICTION IN SINGAPORE†
The concepts of separability and competence-competence, which
promote arbitral autonomy, exist in many jurisdictions. This article
surveys the extent of their acceptance in Singapore’s domestic and
international arbitration law, and suggests that legislative
refinements are necessary to remove doubts and resolve conflicts
between the law and the SIAC Rules.
Does an arbitrator have the jurisdiction to determine his or her own
jurisdiction under an arbitration agreement? This is a question that the law
has long wrestled with. The law’s response has been to develop two
doctrines: separability and competence-competence. This article investigates
their value and compares the current legal position in several jurisdictions
with the local position. It is submitted that the two doctrines play an
important role in promoting the arbitral process as a means of dispute
resolution, and that legislative changes may be needed in Singapore to
ensure that this process is not impeded.
I. SEPARABILITY AND COMPETENCE-COMPETENCE
COMPARED
A. Scope and Purpose
The doctrines of separability1 and competence-competence2 are related,
but distinct. The concept of separability means that the validity of the
arbitration clause does not depend on the validity of the remaining parts
of the contract in which it is contained. As long as the arbitration clause
itself is validly entered into by the parties and worded sufficiently broadly
to cover non-contractual disputes, an arbitrator may declare a contract
invalid but still retain jurisdiction to decide a dispute as to the consequences
of the invalidity.3 By treating arbitration agreements as distinct from the
main contract, separability rescues many arbitration agreements from failing
simply because they are contained in contracts the validity of which is
questioned.
Competence-competence picks up where separability ends. The doctrine
has two aspects. Firstly, it means that arbitrators are judges of their own
jurisdiction and have the right to rule on their own competence. Therefore,
if the validity of the arbitration agreement itself and thus the competence
†
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This article is from a paper written for the Commercial Arbitration and Alternative
Dispute Resolution course in the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore.
Also called severability or autonomy.
Known in French as compétence de la compétence and in German as Kompetenz-
Kompetenz.
Marcus S Jacobs, “The Separability of the Arbitration Clause: Has the Principle Been
Finally Accepted in Australia?” (1994) 68 ALJ 629 at 629.
45
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7
8
Carl Svernlöv, “What Isn’t, Ain’t: The Current Status of the Doctrine of Separability”
(1991) 8(4) JIA 37 at 37.
Infra, n 74–78, and the accompanying text.
Stephen M Schwebel, International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems (1987) ch 1,1–13.
Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbotlom) [1918] 1 KB 592 at 605; Shirlaw v
Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206 at 227.
This argument was approved by Leggatt LJ in Harbour Assurance, infra, n 32, at 464,
Contrast Adam Samuel who criticises this argument in his review of Schwebel’s book in
(1988) 5(2) JIA 119 at 120–1. Samuel agrees with J Gillis Wetter that when two parties
enter into a contract it is almost always very far from their minds and from the minds of
their legal advisers that they are entering into two separate contracts: see Schwebel,
supra, n 6, at 9. Samuel prefers to justify separability on the principle that the court
applies a presumption in favour of separability of an arbitral clause to preclude unnecessary
disruption of the arbitration (cf Schwebel’s second justification in the main text).
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of the arbitrator is impugned, he or she does not have to stop proceedings
but can continue the arbitration and consider whether he or she has
jurisdiction. Secondly, in some countries, the arbitration agreement ousts
the initial jurisdiction of ordinary courts. If the prima facie existence of the
arbitration agreement is objected to, a court must refer the dispute to
arbitration.4 But there is great variation where this second aspect is
concerned. In civil law countries such as France, arbitrators appear to have
a wide jurisdiction to determine their competence. The prevalent view in
common law countries is that arbitrators have only a limited competence
to rule on their jurisdiction, and that these rulings may be reopened and
scrutinised by the courts.5
B. Justifications
Schwebel6 justifies the separability doctrine on four grounds:
i.
ii.
When parties enter into an arbitration agreement which is widely
phrased, they usually intend to require that all disputes, including
disputes over the validity of the contract, are to be settled by
arbitration. This may be an implied term of the contract. For
instance, applying the officious bystander test,7 if the parties when
concluding the agreement had been asked, “Do you mean, in
providing that ‘any dispute arising out of or relating to this
agreement’ shall be submitted to arbitration, to exclude disputes
over the validity of the agreement?”, surely they would have
replied that they did not mean to exclude such disputes. Applying
the separability doctrine thus gives effect to the will of the
parties.8
If simply by denying that the main contract is valid one party can
deprive the arbitrator of competence to rule upon that allegation,
this provides a loophole for parties to repudiate their obligation
to arbitrate. This defeats one of the main advantages of choosing
arbitration over litigation as a means of dispute settlement: speed
and simplicity without the time and expense of the courts. The
910
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13
This reasoning was applied by Steyn J in Paul Smith Ltd v H & S International Holdings
Inc, infra, n 30.
Alan Redfern, “The Jurisdiction of an International Commercial Arbitrator” (1986) 3(1)
J1A 19 at 30.
Ibrahim FI Shihata, The Power of the International Court to Determine Its Own Jurisdiction
(1965) 25–6, cited in Janet A Rosen, “Arbitration Under Private International Law: The
Doctrines of Separability and Compétence de la Compétence” (1994) 17 Fordham Int’l
LJ 599 at 608; Clive M Schmitthoff, “The Jurisdiction of the Arbitrator” in The Art of
Arbitration (Jan C Schultsz & Albert Jan van den Berg eds, 1982) 285 at 292–3.
Shihata, ibid.
Schmitthoff, ibid.
i.
ii.
There is a rebuttable presumption that such jurisdictional power
has been conferred by the will of the parties when they entered
into the arbitration agreement.12 If it is presumed that the parties
have conferred the arbitrator with the jurisdiction to decide his
or her own jurisdiction in the same way that he or she deals with
the other legal matters arising in the arbitration, the court should
respect the contract of the parties so long as the arbitrator acts
in good faith.13
Since section 30 of the Arbitration Act (Cap 10, 1985 Rev Ed)
allows exclusion agreements, ie agreements in which the parties
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problem is worse in international arbitration agreements, since
there is no international court with compulsory jurisdiction to
determine and enforce the validity of the contract.
iii.
iv.
There is a well-established legal fiction that when parties enter
into a contract containing an arbitration clause, they are really
entering into two separate agreements: the principal agreement
containing their substantive obligations, and the arbitration
agreement which provides for the settlement of disputes arising
out of the principal agreement. This legal fiction is perfectly
justified if we consider what happens if the parties enter into two
physically-separate contracts. In this situation, if the principal
agreement is alleged to be void, there is no question about the
validity of the arbitration agreement since it is an independent
contract. Is it logical, then, to treat an arbitration agreement
which appears as a clause in a contract differently?9
It is a widespread practice that courts usually review only arbitral
awards and not the merits of disputes which are meant to be
arbitrated. However, if we do not accept the separability doctrine,
courts would be forced to do this very thing.
The competence-competence doctrine is more controversial. As a matter
of strict logic, it is hard to see how an arbitrator has the jurisdiction to
determine his or her own competence since to do so presupposes that he
or she already possesses competence under the very agreement which is
doubted.10 However, the doctrine has been justified on several grounds:11
424 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1995)
iii.
exclude judicial review of the award completely, the parties must
a fortiori be able to exclude the rule that the arbitrator cannot
finally decide on his own jurisdiction.14
Competence-competence power is inherent in all judicial bodies
and is essential to their ability to function.15
Competence-competence is best seen as a rule of convenience designed to
reduce unmeritorious challenges to an arbitrator’s jurisdiction. It also
promotes the arbitral process by giving arbitrators the competence to decide
their own competence so that parties are not compelled to seek relief in
the courts.
Separability and competence-competence are connected. It has been said
that the competence-competence rule is a corollary of the separability
doctrine since separability creates a need for the arbitrator to have
jurisdiction to rule not only on the main contract’s validity but also on the
validity of the arbitration agreement.16 Alternatively, separability can be
seen as a principle of substantive law which enlarges the effective range of
the procedural law principle of competence-competence.17 Working in
tandem, the two doctrines prevent attempts to thwart the parties’ true
intent, which is usually to have all disputes under the contract resolved by
arbitration. They also promote the arbitral process generally by removing
the need to resort to the courts to determine preliminary issues of
jurisdiction.
II. THE JURISDICTIONS COMPARED
A. England
1. Separability18
For a long time, the arbitration clause and the other provisions in a contract
were seen as an indivisible whole. If the contract was invalid, the arbitration
14
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17
18
Schmitthoff, ibid, at 293.
Shihata, ibid. Schmitthoff, ibid at 291–2, is unconvinced by this justification: “The analogy
with the position of the judge does not provide an answer. The judge has an inherent
jurisdiction to rule on his own jurisdiction but the exercise of this jurisdiction is normally
supervised by a court of appeal and it can, therefore, not be said that in this matter he
is a judge in his own cause. Moreover, we have learnt from Lord Diplock’s speech in
Bremer Vulkan [infra, n 23] that there are considerable differences between the position
of the judge and that of the arbitrator, who derives his jurisdiction from the contract of
the parties. Nor does the analogy with arbitration in public international law help because,
as already observed, in these cases the supervisory jurisdiction of a national court is
absent.”
Rosen, supra, n 11, at 609.
Aaron Broches, Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration (1990) at 76 para 9.
Svernlöv, supra, n 4; Jacobs, supra, n 3, at 632–4; Andrew Rogers & Rachel Launders,
“Separability — the Indestructible Arbitration Clause” (1994) 10 Arb Int’l 77 at 82–6;
Rosen, supra, n 11, at 627–35.
19
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23
[1916] 2 Ch 86 (CA).
(1942) 72 L1 L Rep 65 (HL).
Supra, n 20, at 75.
Ibid, at 77 col 2. See also Lord Porter’s comments at 85.
[1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 253 (HL), Lord Edmund-Davies and Lord Russell of Killowen
concurring. See also Black Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-
Aschaffenbufg AB [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 446; Paal Wilson & Co v Partenreederei (The
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provisions never bound the parties, and hence no arbitrator appointed
under the provisions had any authority to act. This is illustrated by Smith,
Corey & Barrett v Becker, Gray & Co19 in which the parties were held to
be bound by an arbitration clause because the contract containing it was
valid ab initio. The implication is that if the contract had been invalid, the
arbitration clause would also have been invalid and of no effect.
It was in Heyman v Darwins20 that the separability doctrine was clearly
enunciated by the House of Lords. In Heyman, the defendant steel
manufacturers alleged that the plaintiffs, who were their selling agents,
had improperly involved them in certain liabilities. They refused to pay
commission due to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs instituted a court action
against the defendants, but the defendants applied to court for the action
to be stayed, contending that the dispute should be dealt with under the
arbitration clause in the contract. The House of Lords found that the
parties had entered into a valid and binding contract, and that the difference
that had arisen related only to whether either side had breached the contract
or whether circumstances had arisen which discharged one or both parties
from further performance. In such a situation, the arbitration clause was
valid and applicable. Lord Macmillan, with whom Lord Russell of Killowen
agreed, approved the severability doctrine:
I venture to think that not enough attention has been directed to the
true nature and function of an arbitration clause in a contract. It is
quite distinct from other clauses. The other clauses set out the
obligations which the parties undertake towards each other him inde,
but the arbitration clause does not impose on one of the parties an
obligation in favour of the other. It embodies the agreement of both
parties that, if any dispute arises with regard to the obligations which
the one party has undertaken to the other, such dispute shall be
settled by a tribunal of their own constitution.21
Said Lord Wright:
[An arbitration agreement] is collateral to the substantial stipulations
of the contract. It is merely procedural and ancillary, it is a mode of
settling disputes, though the agreement to do so is itself subject to
the discretion of the court. All this may be said of every agreement
to arbitrate, even though not a separate bargain, but one incorpo-
rated in the general contract.22
This rule has been confirmed by many cases, including Bremer Vulkan
Schiffbau und Maschinefabrik v South India Shipping Corporation,23 in
24
25
26
27
28
29
Hannah Blumenthal) [1983] 1 AC 854 (HL); Compagnie Europeene de Cereals SA v
Tradax Export SA [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 301 at 306; Furness Withy (Aust) Pty Ltd v Metal
Distributors (UK) Ltd (The Amazonia) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 236 at 244 (CA).
Supra, n 20, at 71 col 2 (emphasis added).
Ibid, at 73 col 2 (emphasis added).
[1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 223 (CA).
[1988] 2 All ER 577, per May LJ at 586; per Balcombe LJ at 589: “an arbitrator cannot
have jurisdiction to decide that the contract under which he is appointed is void or
voidable, since by so doing he would be destroying the very basis of his own position.”
Contra Bingham LJ, at 591, who restricted himself to saying that an arbitrator cannot
make a binding award as to the initial existence of the agreement from which jurisdiction
is said to derive.
Supra, n 20, at 85.
Ibid, at 81 col 1.
426 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1995)
which Lord Diplock cited Heyman as authority for the assertion that: “The
arbitration clause constitutes a self-contained contract collateral or ancillary
to the shipbuilding agreement itself.”
The separability doctrine was the ratio decidendi of Heyman, Yet a majority
of the judges proceeded to make obiter statements which dominated English
legal thinking for more than 50 years. Viscount Simon LC said:
If the dispute is as to whether the contract which contains the clause
has ever been entered into at all, that issue cannot go to arbitration
under the clause, for the party who denies that he has ever entered
into the contract is thereby denying that he has ever joined in the
submission. Similarly, if one party to the alleged contract is contending
that it is void ab initio (because, for example, the making of such a
contract is illegal), the arbitration clause itself also is void.24
Lord Macmillan (and thus Lord Russell) remarked that:
If it appears that the dispute is as to whether there has been a binding
contract between the parties, such a dispute cannot be covered by an
arbitration clause in the challenged contract. If there has never been
a contract at all, there has never been as a part of it an agreement to
arbitrate; the greater includes the less. Further, a claim to set aside a
contract on such grounds as fraud, duress or essential error, cannot be
the subject matter of a reference under an arbitration clause in the
contract sought to be set aside.25
So great was the eminence of these pronouncements that they were accepted
without question by both plaintiff and defendant in Dalmia Dairy Industries
v National Bank of Pakistan,26 and reaffirmed by a majority in Ashville
Investments Ltd v Elmer Contractors Ltd.27
In contrast, Lord Porter28 and Lord Wright29 held that an arbitrator can
have jurisdiction to hear a dispute in which one party alleges that the
contract is void ab initio if the arbitration clause is phrased widely enough.
Separability, Competence-Competence and the Arbitrator 427
This view gradually came to be preferred. In Paul Smith Ltd v H & S
International Holdings Inc,30 it was held, obiter, that while no court had yet
ruled that an arbitration clause is wide enough to cover a dispute as to
whether a contract is valid ab initio, an arbitration agreement separately
executed at the same time as the principal contract is capable of conferring
authority on an arbitrator to decide an issue as to the validity ab initio of
the contract. If this is so, Steyn J queried, why should the same not apply
to an arbitration agreement which physically forms part of the contract, if
it is recognised as having a separate existence? Since it was “possible to say
with confidence that the evolution of the separability doctrine in English
law is virtually complete”, this step was a logical and sensible one which
an English court might be prepared to take if it arose.31
The opportunity arrived in Harbour Assurance v Kansa General
International Insurance32 All three judges of the Court of Appeal held that
if the arbitration clause is not directly impeached, an arbitration agreement
is, as a matter of principled legal authority, capable of surviving the invalidity
of the contract so that the arbitrator has jurisdiction to determine the
initial validity of the contract. Hoffmann LJ, for instance, rejected the
argument that an arbitration clause contained in a contract which is void
ab initio must necessarily be invalid:
The flaw in the logic, as it seems to me, lies in the ambiguity of the
proposition that the arbitration clause “formed part” of the
retrocession agreement. In one sense of course it did. It was cl 12 of
a longer document which also dealt with the substantive rights and
duties of the parties. But parties can include more than one agreement
in a single document. They may say in express words that two separate
agreements are intended. Or the question of whether the document
amounts to one agreement or two may have to be answered by
reference to the kind of provisions it contains.33
Heyman was distinguished, the Court of Appeal treating the House of
Lords’ comments as mere dicta. The court was impressed by policy reasons
such as (1) the need to disentitle one party from preventing arbitration
simply by alleging that the contract is void for initial illegality;34 (2) the
desirability of giving effect to the right of the parties to choose a tribunal
to resolve their disputes; and (3) the practical advantages of one-stop
adjudication which would avoid the inconvenience of having one issue
resolved by the court, and further issues decided by the arbitrator based
on the outcome.35
7 S.Ac.L.J.
30
31
32
33
34
35
[1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127. See Carl M Svernlöv, “The Evolution of the Doctrine of
Separability in England: Now Virtually Complete?” (1992) 9 JIA 115.
Ibid, at 130–1.
[1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 455 (CA).
Ibid, at 467-8.
Ibid, at 464 col 2.
Ibid, at 469 col 1.
As leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused,36 Harbour Assurance
represents the prevailing English position on the separability of arbitration
agreements. Thus, an arbitration agreement contained in a main contract
is severable and has a life of its own. If appropriately worded, it confers
jurisdiction on the arbitrator even to rule that the main contract is void ab
initio. The arbitrator only lacks jurisdiction if the arbitration agreement
itself is alleged to be invalid or non-existent.37
2. Competence-Competence38
It has been alleged that English law does not recognise the competence-
competence rule.39 This statement is too sweeping. It is submitted that the
rule exists, although in a limited form. In Christopher Brown v
Genossenschaft Österreichischer Waldbesitzer Holzwirtschaftsbetriebe,
Registrierte GmBH,40 it was held that when the jurisdiction of arbitrators
is challenged, they may, if they wish, immediately refuse to act until their
jurisdiction has been determined by a court which has the power to make
a final determination. But they can also choose to decide for themselves
whether they have jurisdiction. In this case, their determination will not be
binding; the losing party can challenge the ruling as of right in the courts
Ibid, at 470 col 2.
Ibid, per Hoffmann LJ at 468 col 2: “There will obviously be cases in which a claim that
no contract came into existence necessarily entails a denial that there was any agreement
to arbitrate. Cases of non est factum or denial that there was a concluded agreement, or
mistake as to the identity of the other contracting party suggest themselves as examples.
But there is no reason why every case of initial invalidity should have this consequence.”
Jacobs, supra, n 3, at 630, remarks that some cases seem to suggest that the separability
principle extends even to cases where one party seeks to avoid arbitration by denying
that the principal agreement or the arbitration agreement was ever concluded. He cites
as authority Shenzhen Nan Da Industrial & Trade United Co Ltd v FM International Ltd,
unreported, 2 March 1991 (SC, Hong Kong); and Sojuznefteexport (SNE) (USSR) v Joc
Oil Ltd (1989) 4 Mealey’s International Arbitration Report 8, (1990) XV Yearbook of
Commercial Arbitration 384 (CA, Bermuda). I am unable to comment on the Shenzhen
case as it was unavailable, but the Sojuznefteexport case does not appear to support
Jacobs’ wide proposition. On the contrary, it is consistent with the general position at
English law. In that case, the signatory to an agreement containing an arbitration clause
had no authority to bind the plaintiff to substantive obligations but was authorised to sign
an arbitration agreement. The court held that the arbitration clause was separable and
binding. Hoffmann LJ in Harbour Assurance, supra, n 32, at 468–9, felt that: “The decision
was reached under Soviet law as the proper law of the contract, but I think that the
answer in English law would have been the same.”
See Peter Gross, “Competence of Competence: An English View” (1992) 8 Arb Int’l 205.
Phiroze K Irani, “International Commercial Dispute Resolution Through Arbitration —
I” Asia Business Law Review, January 1993 no 1,9 at 17 col 1; Rosen, supra, n 11, at 636,
660–1.
[1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 373 at 376, [1954] 1 QB 8 at 13. See also Golodetz v Schrier (1947)
80 L1 L Rep 647 at 650; Luanda Exportadora SARL v Wahbe Tamari & Sons Ltd [1967]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 353 at 364; Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd v National Bank of Pakistan [1978]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 223 (CA); Industrie Chimiche Italia Centrale v Alexander Tsavrilis and
Sons Maritime Co (The Choko Star) [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 508.
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36
37
38
39
40
without having to satisfy the criteria necessary to bring an appeal.41 The
Queen’s Bench Division in Harbour Assurance42 agreed, stating:
The approach in English law is simple, straightforward and practical.
As a matter of convenience arbitrators may consider, and decide,
whether they have jurisdiction or not: they may decide to assume or
decline jurisdiction... But it is well settled in English law that the
result of such a preliminary decision has no effect whatsoever on the
legal rights of the parties. Only the Court can definitively rule on
issues relating to the jurisdiction of arbitrators. And it is possible to
obtain a speedy declaratory judgment from the Commercial Court as
to the validity of an arbitration agreement before or during arbitration
proceedings.
This was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. As Hoffmann LJ put it: “[i]t is
common ground that in English law an arbitrator cannot bind the parties
by a ruling on his own jurisdiction, and therefore the validity of the
arbitration clause is not an arbitrable issue.”43
From these cases it can be seen that the competence-competence rule
exists in England, but is not absolute. The arbitration agreement continues
to be controlled by the courts.
B. Australia44
Obiter remarks by the High Court of Australia in Codelfa Constructions
Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales45 were applied in IBM
Australia Ltd v National Distribution Services Ltd46 by a two-to-one majority
of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. This case held that arbitrators
have no jurisdiction to determine whether or not a contract containing the
arbitration clause under which they are appointed is void ab initio because
the effect of a declaration that the contract is void is that there never was
a contractually-valid submission to arbitration. However, these remarks
were themselves obiter and were not followed by the Federal Court of
Australia: see QH Tours Ltd v Ship Design & Management (Australia) Pty
Ltd47 and Morton v Baker.48 Neither have state Supreme Courts taken such
In Singapore, under section 28(3) of the Arbitration Act (Cap 10,1985 Rev Ed), a party
can only appeal against an arbitration award if the other parties to the arbitration consent,
or with the court’s leave. Under section 28(4), the court will not grant leave unless it
considers that, having regard to all the circumstances, the determination of the question
of law could substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties to the arbitration
agreement. See Gross, supra, n 38, at 210.
[1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 81 at 83.
Supra, n 32, at 467 col 1.
Jacobs, supra, n 3; Rogers & Launders, supra, n 18.
(1982) 149 CLR 337.
(1991) 22 NSWLR 466 per Clarke JA at 485, Handley JA at 487.
(1991) 105 ALR 371.
Unreported, 25 March 1993.
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
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a stand: Thirteenth Telfab Pty Ltd v Dowsett49 and Ferris v Plaister.50 The
current position may be summarised in the words of Foster J in QH Tours:
I am not satisfied that there is any rule of law which prohibits the
empowering of an arbitrator to decide the initial validity of the contract
containing the arbitration clause... I consider that, generally speaking,
it [the arbitration clause] can be regarded as severable from the main
contract with the result that, logically, an arbitrator, if otherwise
empowered to do so, can declare the main contract void ab initio
without at the same time destroying the basis of his power to do so.51
There does not appear to be any definitive decision on competence-
competence from the Australian courts.52
C. Europe and the United States53
Many European countries, including France,54 Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and Switzerland,55 accept both the separability and competence-
competence doctrines.
In Prima Paint Corp v Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co56 the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the separability doctrine with reference to
the Federal Arbitration Act,57 which applies to interstate and transnational
commerce. Under section 4 of the Act, a federal court must order arbitration
in accordance with the terms of an arbitration agreement if the initial
validity of the arbitration agreement is not itself in issue. The court applied
section 4 in Prima Paint and held that an allegation of fraud in the
inducement of the main contract did not touch the arbitration agreement,
which was separable and thus applicable. Prima Paint was affirmed in
(1990) V Convr 54/366 (SC, Victoria), cited in Michael Pryles, “Current Issues in
International Arbitration in Australia” (1992) 9(4) JIA 57 at 62.
Unreported, 6 May 1993 (SC, NSW).
Supra, n 47, at 384.
Marcus Jacobs points out that the issue arose on the facts of James Wallace Pty Ltd v
Abbey Orchard Property Investments Pty Ltd, unreported, 21 October 1980 (SC, NSW),
but Samuel J in that case found it unhelpful to categorise the question (ie whether the
dispute fell within the ambit of the arbitration clause) as one which touched the arbitrator’s
jurisdiction. Jacobs submits that the judge was incorrect: Marcus S Jacobs, Commercial
Arbitration Law and Practice (1990) vol 1A at 1785 para 5.90.
Rosen, supra, n 11, at 617-27; Jacobs, supra, n 3, at 636.
Rosen, supra, n 11, at 638–49.
Jacobs, supra, n 3, at 636-8.
(1967) 388 US 395. This case is consistent with HW Moseley v Electronic & Missile
Facilities Inc (1963) 374 US 167 at 171–2.
9 USC sections 1-16 (1988 & Supp IV 1992).
430
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
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Republic of Philippines and National Power Corp v Westinghouse Electric
Corp58 where the court stated:
Prima Paint is alive and healthy... The challenge for the party who
believes himself to be the victim of a fraud and wishes to fight it out
in the court is to demonstrate that the fraud was specifically directed
to the arbitration clause or to convince the court to craft some
exception to the Prima Paint doctrine...
However, the power to decide jurisdictional issues such as the validity of
the arbitration clause is reserved to the judiciary by section 4. As such,
United States law does not espouse the doctrine of competence-
competence.59
III. POSITION IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA
A. Domestic Arbitration
1. Separability
In the context of domestic arbitrations, the separability doctrine is governed
by case law as the Arbitration Act (Cap 10, 1985 Rev Ed) is silent on the
issue. But it is unclear whether the doctrine has been accepted in Singapore.
New India Assurance Co v Lewis60 involved an expired insurance policy on
a racehorse. The insurers required a veterinary certificate to renew the
policy, but the insured party failed to send it to them. The horse died. The
insurers repudiated liability and claimed that since no policy was in force,
the arbitration clause in the policy could not be invoked. Speaking for the
Federal Court of Malaysia on appeal from Singapore, Wee Chong Jin CJ
said:
It is settled law that where the dispute is as to whether a contract,
which contains an arbitration clause in the widest and most usual
form... was entered into at all cannot go to arbitration under the
clause. The reason why such an issue cannot go to arbitration is
because in the words of Viscount Simon LC in Heyman v Darwins
Ltd61 at page 343, “The party who denies that he has ever entered
into the contract is thereby denying that he has ever joined in the
submission.” In the words of Lord Macmillan, ibid, at page 345, “If
there has never been a contract at all, there has never been as part
of it an agreement to arbitrate; the greater includes the less.”62
(1989) 714 F Supp 1362. See also Sauer-Getriebe KG v While Hydraulics, Inc (1983) 715
F 2d 348 at 350; Peoples Security Life Insurance Co v Monumental Life Insurance Co
(1989) 867 F 2d 809; Republic of Nicaragua v Standard Fruit Co (1991) 937 F 2d 469.
Rosen, supra, n 11, at 623 n 141 (citations of cases establishing that competence-
competence is not accepted in the United States), 627.
[1967] 1 MLJ 156.
Supra, n 20.
Ibid, at 157 col 1D-F.
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58
59
60
61
62
Toller v Law Accident Insurance Society63 was cited with approval. This
case involved a dispute over the validity of a motor insurance policy
containing an arbitration clause. The plaintiff claimed that the issue of
whether the policy in fact existed or not fell within the arbitration clause.
However, this was rejected by the court. In its opinion, if the arbitrator
found that there was no contract of insurance, he would be confirming the
non-existence of the very clause on which his jurisdiction was founded.
Therefore he could not have had any jurisdiction to proceed with the
matter in the first place.64
Jackman v Culifrance Furniture Pte Ltd,65 an unreported 1992 decision of
the High Court, reached a similar conclusion. The plaintiff in this case
alleged breach of an employment contract and brought an action against
the defendant. The defendant applied to the court to stay the proceedings
pending arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause in the employment
contract. The Assistant Registrar dismissed the application. The defendant
appealed, but he inexplicably challenged the very existence and validity of
the contract. Quoting the obiter remarks of Viscount Simon LC and Lord
Macmillan in Hey man, and approving New India Assurance,66 Rubin JC
concluded:
In the case at hand, the defendants’ principal contention was that
there was no contract in existence between the parties. That contention
necessarily stymied their attempt to make use of the arbitration clause
contained in the self-same Agreement. On the basis of the authorities
I have just referred to, the defendant’s arguments failed at the
threshold and I therefore dismissed the defendant’s appeal on stay
pending arbitration.67
The most that can be said about New India Assurance and Jackman is that
they are consistent with the separability doctrine. If what is disputed is the
very existence of the contract (and thus the arbitration agreement), an
arbitrator can only have jurisdiction under the competence-competence
and not the separability doctrine.68 The two cases say nothing about whether
(1936) 55 LI L Rep 258 (CA). See also Produce Bakers v Olympia Oil and Cake [1916]
1 AC 314 at 327.
Toller, ibid, at 259. Toller was also applied in Lan You Timber Co v United General
Insurance Co Ltd [1968] 1 MLJ 181 (HC, Kuala Lumpur).
Unreported, Suit No 1590 of 1991, 30 September 1992 (HC). The case is available in the
NUS Law Library’s collection of unreported judgments: (1992) 20 Singapore High Court
Judgments 4742.
The High Court in Jackman’s case was probably bound to follow New India Assurance
Co, which was a decision of the Federal Court on appeal from Singapore: see the dicta
in Mah Kah Yew v PP [1971] 1 MLJ 1 at 3 (HC) and Ng Sui Nam v Butterworth & Co
(Publishers) Ltd [1987] 2 MLJ 10 at 17 (CA). See Walter Woon, “The Doctrine of
Judicial Precedent” in The Singapore Legal System (Walter Woon ed, 1989) 239 at 257.
Ibid, at 21C para 33.
Supra, n 37, and the accompanying text.
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an arbitration agreement may be given effect if the main contract is not
non-existent but merely void, voidable or incapable of further performance.
In comparison, the separability doctrine has been implicitly adopted in
Malaysia. In Forest Development Sdn Bhd v Syarikat Permodalan dan
Perusahaan Pahang Bhd,69 the defendant purported to terminate the
contract entered into with the plaintiff. The plaintiff instituted a court
action, but the defendant applied for a stay of proceedings in favour of the
arbitration clause in the contract. The plaintiff resisted the stay on the
ground that the defendant’s purported termination of the agreement also
terminated the arbitration clause in the agreement. George J found that
since the act purporting to terminate the contract was not per se tantamount
to demonstrating that the defendant was unwilling to arbitrate, the
defendant was entitled to have the action stayed.70 Though the court’s
remark on the defendant’s “unwillingness” is puzzling, since a reluctance
to arbitrate has never been held to justify rejection of a valid arbitration
agreement, it is implicit in the judgment that the arbitration clause was
severable from the main contract. Unfortunately, quoting Viscount Simon
LC in Heyman,71 the court also held that there was no suggestion that the
agreement was void ab initio or had come to naught as a result of frustration,
hinting that had these factors been present the decision might have gone
the other way. English cases now show us that this assertion is inaccurate.72
It is submitted that since recent developments in most other jurisdictions
point irresistibly towards the acceptance of separability, this doctrine will
eventually be applied in Singapore. We need only wait for an authoritative
decision from the Court of Appeal, preferably explaining the effect of New
India Assurance and Jackman. Alternatively, an amendment to the
Arbitration Act affirming the separability doctrine is welcome.
2. Competence-Competence
New India Assurance and Jackman may also suggest that the competence-
competence rule does not apply in Singapore. In the former case, Wee
Chong Jin CJ held:
... If the decision of Buttrose J appointing an arbitrator is right, then,
if the arbitrator found there was no contract in existence at all and
no right to sue on the policy... he would be deciding that the arbitration
clause which founded his jurisdiction never existed and therefore he
never could have had any jurisdiction to deal with the matter73
[1981] 2 MLJ 255 (HC, Kuantan).
Supra, n 69, at 287.
Supra, n 24.
Supra, n 37, and the accompanying text.
Supra, n 60, at 157 col 1I (emphasis added).
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However, the point was not specifically addressed and must be considered
open. No authoritative Malaysian cases on the point are evident. We have
seen that English common law grants arbitrators a limited right to inquire
into their own jurisdiction.74 On the other hand, in some civil law countries
the competence-competence rule is more far-reaching. For instance, under
Article 1466 of the French Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile, it is the
arbitrator who rules both on the limits of his or her jurisdictional power
and on the merits of the matter. Under Article 1458, a court must, absent
manifest nullity75 of the arbitration clause, declare itself incompetent to
render a decision on the merits. Therefore, arbitrators have exclusive
competence to decide challenges to their jurisdiction whether based on an
alleged invalidity of the arbitration agreement or the main contract
containing it.76
Commentator Janet Rosen feels that the retention of judicial control over
arbitration agreements in United States and English law inhibits the
effectiveness of international arbitration by affording parties a means to
avoid their obligation to arbitrate, negating certain advantages attributed
to arbitration such as reducing the judicial workload and providing a less
expensive dispute resolution mechanism, and detracting from the credibility
of the arbitral process as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. She
praises and recommends the French approach.77 In support of the English
position, Peter Gross notes that in English law a party who wishes to
challenge the arbitrator’s jurisdiction can seek a declaration from the court
prior to any decision on the matter by the arbitrator, raise objections to
the arbitrator during the arbitration, or mount a challenge in court after
the award has been made or during enforcement proceedings. He feels
that this flexibility to conclusively resolve jurisdictional issues in the early
stages has much to commend it since it can save time and costs.78 Given
Singapore’s common law tradition, it is likely that our courts will adopt the
limited competence-competence rule. But neither the common law nor
civil law position is binding on us. For the sake of clarity, our legislature
Supra, n 38–43, and the accompanying text.
Not defined in the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile, but one commentator has suggested
that it may mean a literal contravention of one of the legal conditions imposed for the
validity of the agreement under French law which does not require any interpretation to
be established, eg a failure to designate an arbitrator or to prescribe any method of
appointment: Christopher R Seppala, “French Domestic Arbitration Law” (1982) 16 Int’l
Lawyer 749 at 762.
Seppala, ibid, at 761-2, 771-3. See also Bai Line Shipping Co v Société Recofi, 21 January
1992, Cass Com, Bull Civ IV, No 30, at 25, cited in Rosen, supra, n 11, at 645-7. Cf
Société Impex v Société PAZ, 18 May 1971, Cass civ Inc, 1971 Bull Civ I, No 161, at 134,
cited in Rosen at 642-3, in which the court declared itself incompetent to judge the
dispute and referred the matter to arbitration under the contract because an arbitrator
can judge all conflicts that arise even if the conflicts relate to the existence and validity
of the arbitration clause. This case was decided before the Nouveau Code de Procédure
Civile was promulgated.
Rosen, supra, n 11, at 651-66.
Gross, supra, n 38, at 211-2.
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should decide which view it prefers and amend the Arbitration Act
accordingly.
B. International Commercial Arbitration
The scope of the competence-competence rule in domestic arbitrations has
an impact on international arbitrations. Such arbitrations are now regulated
in Singapore by the International Arbitration Act 1994 (“IAA”),79 which
was recently enacted to give legal effect to the Model Law of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).80 Article
16(1) of the Model Law reflects both the competence-competence and
separability doctrines:
The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any
objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration
agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part
of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the
other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that
the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity
of the arbitration clause.
According to Article 16(3), the arbitral tribunal may either rule on its
jurisdiction as a preliminary question, or in an award on the merits. If it
chooses to make a preliminary ruling, any party can refer the matter to the
High Court for a final determination. Section 10 of the IAA modifies the
Model Law by permitting further appeal to the Court of Appeal if leave
is granted by the High Court.81 However, Article 1(5) provides:
This Law shall not affect any other law of this State82 by virtue of
which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration or may be
submitted to arbitration only according to provisions other than those
of this Law.
This suggests that the elaborate scheme set up by the Model Law to give
latitude to the arbitral tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction may be
undermined if the English doctrine of limited competence-competence is
adopted by our courts. To fix this problem, it is submitted that the common
law competence-competence rule should be replaced by a suitable provision
in the domestic Arbitration Act. Section 5(4) of the IAA will then ensure
No 23 of 1994, now Cap 143A, 1995 Ed. Note that the IAA and Model Law can be made
applicable to domestic arbitrations by an agreement in writing between the parties: section
5(1) of the IAA. On the IAA generally, see Hsu Locknie, “The Adoption of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in Singapore” [1994]
SJLS 387.
Section 3(1) of the IAA states: “Subject to this Act, the Model Law... shall have the force
of law in Singapore.”
This has been criticised by Hsu Locknie, supra, n 79, at 396–8.
Defined to be Singapore by section 3(2) of the IAA.
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that the Arbitration Act is inapplicable to all international commercial
arbitrations which are subject to the IAA.
C. Relation to the SIAC Rules
Further conflict becomes evident when we consider the interrelation
between the Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre
(SIAC),83 which parties may choose as the procedure governing their
arbitrations, and the domestic Arbitration Act and lAA/Model Law
respectively. Rule 25.1 of the SIAC Rules is in pari materia with Article
16(1) of the Model Law. Unlike the Model Law, though, under rule 31
there is no right of appeal to the courts. The intention is apparently to give
absolute competence to arbitrators to finally determine their own
jurisdiction. But if parties choose procedural rules which deviate from the
law, the latter will prevail.84 Furthermore, as commentator Phiroze Irani
has pointed out,85 according to rule 1.1 the SIAC Rules “shall govern the
arbitration except where any of these Rules is in conflict with a provision
of the law applicable to the arbitration which the parties cannot derogate”.
Article 16(3) of the Model Law and the limited competence-competence
rule in domestic arbitrations (if applied to Singapore) may be such non-
derogable laws. All this raises the possibility that parties to arbitrations
under the SIAC Rules will still have recourse to the courts on questions
of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, thus defeating the scheme laid down by the
Rules. This is unfortunate because it limits the parties’ freedom to choose
the procedure to govern their arbitration.
IV. CONCLUSION
If there is one theme that characterises arbitration law, it is the tussle
between arbitral autonomy and judicial supervision of the arbitral tribunal.
The way our law develops will depend on the policy the legislature decides
to adopt. Parliament must decide whether to further arbitral autonomy by
employing the far-reaching French competence-competence rule, or judicial
control through the limited English rule, and amend the domestic
Arbitration Act accordingly to avoid uncertainty. Separability is less of a
problem. In the domestic arbitration context Singapore has yet to recognise
the doctrine, but it is probably only a matter of time before our courts
adopt it as it has been affirmed in many civil and common law jurisdictions.
Having said this, it is still preferable for Parliament to remove all ambiguity
by adding a section to the Arbitration Act confirming that the separability
doctrine exists in Singapore.
Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (1991).
Cf Hsu Locknie, supra, n 79, at 409.
Irani, supra, n 39, at 17-8.
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Where international commercial arbitration is concerned, the more absolute
competence-competence rule in the Model Law suggests that it is
Parliament’s intention to grant arbitrators greater autonomy to finally
determine their own jurisdiction than in domestic arbitrations. Parliament
should therefore refine the Arbitration Act by stating that the common
law competence-competence rule, if adopted in Singapore, only applies to
domestic arbitrations and not to international commercial arbitrations. This
will ensure that the more extensive competence-competence rule in the
Model Law is not impaired.
Finally, the interplay between the Arbitration Act, the IAA, and other
procedural rules such as the SIAC Rules has unintended effects. A policy
choice is in order. The current state of law conforms to the judicial control
model. But, it is submitted, there is much to be said for permitting parties
to adopt a wider competence-competence rule.86 If this view is accepted by
Parliament, further revision of the domestic Arbitration Act and IAA is in
order.
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Supra, n 77, and the accompanying text.
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